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On July 30, 2008, the WTO negotiations broke down because Members could not bridge their 
differences on the operation of a Special Safeguard Mechanism (SSM) for low-income countries. 
This study evaluates two scenarios concerning the recent July (2008) SSM proposal – one in 
which low-income countries are allowed to breach their pre-Doha bound tariffs and one in which 
they are not -- using a global, stochastic, partial equilibrium model of world wheat markets.  We 
find that the July (2008) SSM proposal is not very trade distorting despite leading to sizeable 
SSM duties.  Moreover, the question of whether developing countries should be allowed to 
exceed their pre-Doha bound tariffs depends heavily on the product under consideration, the 
extent of tariff cuts to bound rates, and  the gap between a Members bound and applied tariffs, 
particularly when the volume-based SSM remedies are used.     
   2
Introduction 
Negotiations over the Special Safeguard Mechanism (SSM) for developing countries in 
the WTO’s agricultural negotiations intensified in July of 2008, and ultimately, proved to be a 
major reason for the failure of the WTO talks that were expected to produce the final modalities 
texts for agricultural reform.  That a relatively technical detail in the WTO negotiations such as 
the SSM would lead to the collapse of the mini-ministerial meeting in Geneva came as quite 
shock to international trade economists and policy makers alike.  Why would negotiators fail to 
deliver on the prospect of a new round of agricultural reforms over a temporary SSM tariff that is 
designed to counter import surges or sharp price declines?  After so much had been agreed in the 
lead up to the final ministerial meeting among negotiators such as cuts to countries’ high bound 
tariffs, reductions in the overall level of trade-distorting domestic support, and improving market 
access conditions in controversial tariff-rate quota trade, it is surprising that developing countries 
seemingly walked away from the negotiations over the SSM.   
From a developing country perspective, the new round of negotiations (termed the Doha 
Development Agenda, or DDA) is designed to take into account more seriously the special needs 
of low-income countries.  WTO provisions that address the needs of developing countries fall 
under the umbrella of Special and Differential Treatment (SDT).  However, the breakdown of 
the negotiations on July 29, 2008 in Geneva was not about SDT more generally.  Many of the 
SDT provisions for low-income countries, at least in terms of market access, have already been 
worked out: 
•  Developing country tariff cuts will be two-thirds of developed country commitments; 
•  Even smaller tariff cuts will be allowed for Small Vulnerable Economies (SVEs) and 
Recently Acceded Members (RAMS);   3
•  Low-income countries will be allowed to exclude a certain number of special products
1 
from reforms; and  
•  Least Developed Countries (LDCs) will be exempt from tariff cuts.      
The collapse of the WTO negotiations concerning agricultural trade was more about one 
particular trade policy tool (the SSM) under SDT.  In fact, most sources contend that the 
breakdown of the WTO talks wasn’t even about the SSM in general since many of its technical 
parameters are already on the table.  At issue was one particular instance of the SSM and that is 
whether low-income countries should be allowed to exceed their pre-Doha bound tariff rates 
when the SSM is triggered (WTO 2008; Bridges 2008).  Two important points are worth noting 
at this point.  First, it appears that developing countries want the maximum amount of flexibility 
to levy additional SSM duties to protect small-scale farmers even if it means breaching pre-Doha 
bound tariff levels.  Second, for some products in developing countries, applied and bound tariffs 
are very similar making it almost impossible not to exceed pre-Doha bound tariff rates when the 
SSM is triggered.  Vegetable oils in India and many agricultural tariffs in China due to its recent 
accession to the WTO are two examples.     
WTO Members currently have recourse to other safeguard measures such as general 
WTO Safeguards under Article XIX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 
which apply to all products, not just agricultural goods, as well as the Special Agricultural 
Safeguard (SSG) established under Article 5 of the Agreement on Agriculture during the 
Uruguay Round.  However, there are at least three reasons why developing countries are calling 
for a new SSM.   
                                                 
1 Special Products will be subject to “more flexible treatment” through lower tariff reductions over longer 
implementation periods. At the WTO ministerial Conference in Hong Kong in December 2005, Members agreed 
that developing countries will have the flexibility to self-designate an appropriate number of SPs but this designation 
should be guided by indicators of food security, livelihood and rural development initiatives.   4
First, the general WTO Safeguard requires an injury test as well as the provision of 
compensation when it is used.  Proving injury and providing compensation are often beyond the 
technical and financial capabilities of low income countries (Grant and Meilke 2006; Sharma 
2006).  Moreover, developing countries argue that by the time injury to local farmers is 
demonstrated, the damage from import surges or price declines has already occurred.  Second, 
the Uruguay Round SSG was created specifically for agricultural products and does not require 
and injury test nor the provision of compensation if it is used.  However, the SSG is restricted to 
those products that were included in the tariffication process, a process that applied to fewer than 
20 percent of agricultural tariff lines in developing nations (Valdes and Foster 2005).  Most 
developing countries set bound tariffs outside of the tariffication process because they did not 
apply non-tariff barriers prior to the Uruguay Round.  As a result, SSG use since the start of the 
Uruguay Round has been dominated by developed countries (Grant and Meilke 2006). 
The commitment to a new SSM for developing countries is recognized in all of the draft 
modalities texts tabled to date, but continued disagreement over the exact parameters of the SSM 
(i.e., trigger levels and additional duties), as well as the question of whether developing countries 
should be allowed to exceed their pre-Doha bound tariff rates supports the need for research on 
the issue.  A safeguard mechanism is similar to a variable levy that has the implied objective of 
stabilizing staple commodity markets should imports exceed or prices fall below and exogenous 
trigger level, defined as the most recent three year average of imports or prices, respectively.  
Developed countries might accept a new safeguard mechanism if it does not shut off export 
markets; does not lead to a significant increase in protection on average than what is currently in 
place; and entices low-income importers to reduce tariffs more than in the absence of an SSM.      5
In this study we use a global, stochastic, partial equilibrium model developed in Grant 
and Meilke (2006) to quantify the impact of the recent July Package proposal for tariff cuts and 
the SSM (herein refereed to as the July Package and July Package SSM, respectively).  Three 
scenarios are evaluated.  First, we cut world wheat tariffs according to the July Package formula 
(WTO 2008) and save the results.  Second, we run the same tariff cutting exercise as in scenario 
one, only this time we allow developing and least-developed countries the right to the July 
Package SSM but do not allow them to exceed their pre-Doha bound tariff rates when the SSM is 
triggered.  In the final scenario, we repeat scenario two but remove the provision that developing 
and least-developed countries are not allowed to exceed their pre-Doha bound tariff rates. To 
keep the analysis tractable, we focus only on world wheat markets that are generally a staple 
commodity in many low-income countries.    
This study addresses three economic questions: 
1.  Can the SSM stabilize domestic wheat markets in low-income countries? 
2.  How costly is the proposed SSM, particularly when we allow developing and least-
developed countries to exceed their pre-Doha bound rates? 
3.  How often will low-income countries make use of the SSM? 
4.  What is the size of the additional SSM duties and how often will developing countries 
exceed their pre-Doha bound tariffs? 
The economic impact of an SSM depends largely on: (i) the depth of the price (import) 
fall (surge) relative to the trigger level; (ii) the size and scope of the tariff cutting formula; (iii) 
the magnitude of the additional SSM duties; and (iv) the frequency with which developing 
countries actually make use of the SSM.  Results from this study will provide important   6
economic insight for policy makers that will help guide the remainder of the negotiations over 
the SSM. 
  This study is organized as follows.  Section two reviews the WTO negotiations over the 
SSM and presents a graphical illustration of its design.  In section three, we provide an overview 
of the magnitude of the additional duties using 2006 applied and bound tariff levels for cereals 
published by the WTO (WTO 2008).  Section four introduces the model and data.  Section five 
discusses the results. In the final section we conclude.   
A Summary of the SSM Negotiations 
The need for an SSM has been recognized in several WTO documents.  Too briefly 
recount, on 12 February 2003, Stuart Harbinson, then Chair of the Agricultural negotiations, 
tabled the first draft of modalities texts for agricultural reform.  This was followed by a revised 
modalities draft on 18 March 2003.  Both “blueprints” articulated that the Uruguay Round SSG 
will cease to apply for developed countries and a well-designed SSM will form part of an 
acceptable agricultural package for low-income countries, subject to further technical work 
(WTO 2003a; 2003b).    
In the 13 September 2003 Draft Cancún Ministerial Text, Mexican Foreign Minister Lois 
Ernesto Derbez suggested that: “A special agricultural safeguard shall be established for use by 
developing countries subject to conditions for products to be determined,” (WTO 2003c, p. A-3). 
Paragraph 42 of the “Framework Agreement” tabled on 31 July 2004, also committed WTO 
Members to establishing an SSM for use by developing nations but no progress over its design or 
implementation was made (WTO 2004, p. A-6, 2004).  By the end of the Hong Kong Ministerial   7
Conference in December of 2005, Ministers finally agreed that the SSM shall be established only 
for developing countries and will have both a price and a volume triggers (WTO 2005).
2   
At this point, it was clear that the new SSM for developing countries will be similar in 
structure to the Uruguay Round SSG with both price and volume remedies.  Three months later, 
the G33, a group of (now 42) developing countries tabled the most concrete proposal for an SSM 
(WTO 2006).
 3  The G33 proposal for an SSM was an important building block in the WTO 
negotiations because many aspects of the proposal formed the basis of Chairman Falconer’s first 
and second modalities texts on 8 February 2008, and 19 May 2008 (WTO 2008a; WTO 2008b).  
However, the size of the import surge or price decline required to trigger the SSM, as well as the 
additional duties in Chairman Falconer’s first and second revisions contained numerous 
bracketed options in the draft texts that implied a multitude of scenarios.
4  In many ways, the 
bracketed text reflected the divergent views among WTO Members.   
When Falconer’s third revision was tabled in July 2008 (WTO 2008c), it appeared that 
WTO Members’ had reached a consensus on many of the technical aspects of the SSM, except 
for the question of whether developing countries should be allowed to exceed their pre-Doha 
bound tariff rates.  Members’ differences on this issue proved to be irreconcilable and ultimately 
lead to the collapse of the WTO negotiations.  
 
                                                 
2 After nearly five years of negotiations, this is the first time that Members hinted about the possible design of the 
SSM. 
3 As of April 2005, the 42 Members of the G33 were: Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Botswana, 
China, Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, 
Jamaica, Kenya, Korea, Mauritius, Madagascar, Mongolia, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, 
Peru, Philippines, Saint Kitts & Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent & Grenadines, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Suriname, 
Tanzania, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Uganda, Venezuela, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. 
4 For example, the lowest volume surge, a five to ten percent increase in average import volumes over the most 
recent three-year period, will trigger additional duties of 40 percentage points or half the current bound rate, 
whichever is higher. In another scenario, no duties will be imposed until imports reach at least 30 to 35 percent 
above the reference level with additional SSM duties not exceeding 20 percentage points or one-fifth of the current 
bound rate.  Other bracketed provisions constrain SSM duties within the maximum bound tariff rates established in 
the UR.  The price-based SSM, contains similar options and scenarios.   8
Concerns with the G33 and July Package Safeguard Mechanisms 
In this section, we review the structure and design of the G33 and July Package proposals 
for a new SSM in more detail.  As it turns out, we can gain a number of insights surrounding the 
problem areas of the proposed SSM by presenting a simple graphical analysis of the trigger 
levels and additional duties. 
In both the G33 and July Package SSM proposals, the calculation of the volume trigger is 
equal to the average of the most recent three year period for which import data are available. The 
price trigger is defined analogously and is equal to the average monthly c.i.f import price in the 
most recent three year period for which data are available (WTO 2006; WTO 2008c).   WTO 
Members are largely in agreement with the calculation of the trigger levels and the reference 
periods.  Moreover, Sharma (2006) shows that a three or five year moving average of prices and 
import volumes provide reasonable reference periods for low-income countries.  Because of the 
disagreement over the magnitude of the additional duties concerning the volume trigger, we start 
by discussing its operation first.   
Volume-Based SSM 
The magnitude of the volume-based SSM duty depends on the surge in imports under.  
Table 1 illustrates the potential size of the additional SSM duties under the G33 and July 
Package proposals for three countries (India, Bangladesh, and China) using the most recent 
applied and bound tariff data for cereals based on the WTO World Tariff Profiles 2006 report 
(WTO 2008d).
5   There are minor differences in the depth of the import surge required to trigger 
the volume-based SSM between G33 and July Package SSM proposals.  For example, to trigger 
the volume-based SSM the G33 proposal requires an import surge greater than 105 percent of the 
                                                 
5 We focus on cereals because wheat is used as our case study in the simulation exercise.  Moreover, a detailed 
assessment of the potential SSM duties across all agricultural sectors is beyond the scope of the current study.   9
trigger level.  Higher additional duties are triggered for imports greater than 110 percent but less 
than or equal to 130 percent of the volume trigger, and greater than 130 percent of the volume 
trigger.  In the July Package SSM, the import surge must be greater than 110 percent before the 
volume-based SSM can be used.  The remaining bands are set at 115 and 135 percent of the 
volume trigger.     
More significant differences between the G33 and July Package SSM proposals occur 
when we look at the size of the additional duties for two developing countries (India and China) 
and one least-developed country (Bangladesh) in Table 1.   The variables Tb and Ta denote each 
country’s bound and applied tariff rates for cereals products in 2006, respectively. The G33 
proposal allows for much larger additional duties within its respective bands with coefficients of 
50, 75, and 100 percent of bound tariffs or 40, 50, and 60 percentage points, whichever is higher.  
This compares to 25, 40, and 50 percent of bound tariffs or 25, 40, and 50 percentage points, 
whichever is higher in the July Package SSM.  Thus, for a given bound tariff level, the additional 
SSM duties under the G33 proposal will be roughly double those of the July Package. 
What is noteworthy about Table 1 is that if countries chose to apply the maximum 
additional SSM duty with no restrictions on exceeding pre-Doha bound tariff levels (the main 
sticking point in the negotiations), then the resulting applied tariff rates are likely to disrupt, if 
not shut off, normal trade patterns. For example, India’s 2006 bound and applied tariff rates were 
120 and 40 percent, respectively.  For a volume surge greater than 130 percent above the trigger 
level in the G33 proposal, India is permitted to apply an additional SSM duty of 120 percent 
bringing its new applied tariff rate to 160 percent!  Even under the July Package (assuming pre-
Doha bound tariffs can be breached), the new applied tariff rate for India is 100 percent after   10
applying a 60 percent SSM duty and a volume surge of greater than 130 percent of its trigger 
level.   
Moreover, least-developed countries that are not making tariff cuts and have even larger 
gaps between bound and applied tariff rates will gain a lot of policy flexibility with the SSM.  
Bangladesh’s bound tariff rate for cereal imports averaged 200 percent in 2006.  This translates 
into a 200 percent safeguard tariff under the G33 proposal and 100 percent safeguard tariff under 
the July Package SSM if import penetration is greater than 130 percent (Table 1).   
China’s situation is different because bound and applied tariff rates are very similar given 
its recent accession to the WTO.  This is one case where it is difficult to argue that pre-Doha 
bound tariffs (or those bound tariffs agreed to under accession) should serve as an upper bound 
for the application of SSM duties.  Not allowing China to exceed its bound tariff level would 
effectively eliminate the SSM policy altogether.  This is an important point.  When additional 
SSM duties are tied to current bound tariff levels as in the July Package or G33 proposal, 
countries with similar applied and bound tariff rates have no choice but to exceed their bound 
tariff levels when the SSM is triggered.    
Price-Based SSM 
Figure 1 illustrates the operation of the price-based SSM.  This time however, we add in 
the Uruguay Round safeguard for comparison.
6  The G33 price-based SSM allows for full 
compensation (expressed as a percentage of the import price) once prices fall below the price 
trigger.  Letting P
m denote the current c.i.f. import price in local currency and PT the price trigger 
level, the remedy allowed under the G33 price-based SSM is: Pm/PT-1.  However, as Figure 1 
demonstrates, prices must fall by at least 10 percent below the trigger level before the SSM is 
                                                 
6  We did not evaluate the Uruguay Round SSG when discussing the volume SSM above because the SSG is not 
very trade distorting and the issue of exceeding bound tariff levels is almost of no consequence since the volume-
based remedy under the SSG is simply equal to one-third of the country’s applied tariff rate.     11
triggered.  The July Package modified the G33 price-based remedy in two ways.  First, the c.i.f. 
import price must fall by greater than 15 percent below the trigger level before an SSM duty may 
be imposed (Figure 1).  Second, the price-based remedy is equal to 85 percent of the fall in the 
import price below the trigger level.  Thus the July Package does not allow Members to fully 
offset price declines.   
Illustrated in Figure 1 is a hypothetical situation for a developing country importer with a 
price trigger of $100.   The horizontal axis measures the percentage fall in the import price below 
the trigger.  The vertical axis measures import prices and each line traces out the behavior of 
import prices when an additional price-based SSM duty is added to applied tariff rates.  As 
noted, the G33-SSM fully compensates the price fall such that import prices of $100 are 
maintained as long as the depth of the price decrease is greater than 10 percent below the trigger.  
The July Package compensates for 85 percent of the price fall.  Thus, import prices decrease 
linearly beyond a 15 percent fall below the price trigger.  On the other hand, the UR SSG allows 
for higher additional SSM duties the greater the fall in the import price below the trigger but 
never allows for the compensation provided in the G33 or July Package SSM.              
To see this, Figure 2 plots the size of the additional price-based SSM duties as we allow 
the import price to fall by up to 90 percent below the price trigger.  Interestingly, all three 
proposals (G33, July Package and the UR SSG) could potentially exceed pre-Doha bound tariff 
levels if the price fall below the trigger is severe. For example, if import prices fell by 60 percent 
below the trigger level, the July Package (G33 proposal) would trigger a 198 (233) percent SSM 
tariff.   These additional duties are more than double the SSM duties generated by the UR SSG.  
If the SSG was continued, a 60 percent fall in import prices below the trigger level would 
generate a more modest 86 percent SSM duty.    12
Why Do Developing Countries Need an SSM? 
A final concern of the SSM relates the difference between bound and applied tariff rates 
in developing and least-developed countries.  Figure 3 shows the simple average difference in 
bound and applied tariffs for cereal products across five country groupings: (i) Least-Developed  
Countries (LDC); (ii) Developing countries; (iii) Small Vulnerable Economies (SVE); (iv) the 
CAIRNS group; and (v) the G33 group of developing nations.  What is interesting about Figure 3 
is that low-income countries appear to have a natural safeguard mechanism built into their tariff 
schedules.  In other words, developing countries could, in principle, offset volume surges or 
price declines by simply raising applied tariffs within their bound duty levels.  The gap between 
bound and applied tariffs in LDCs is 61 percentage points.  In other words, LDCs have the 
ability to raise applied tariff rates by a magnitude similar to the final maximum duty option (60 
percent) in the G33 proposal when the import surge exceeds 130 percent.  The G33 and SVE 
countries have similar flexibility with 54 and 41 percentage point gaps between applied and 
bound tariff rates. 
Why are countries with such large differences between their bound and applied tariffs 
worried about an SSM?  As Grant and Meilke (2006) point out, there are at least three reasons 
why a country might not want to raise applied tariffs.  First, applied tariffs are usually specified 
in domestic legislation and are not easily changed.  Second, raising applied tariffs makes it clear 
that the government is favoring domestic producers over domestic consumers.  Finally, while 
wheat tariffs might not be a problem for most low- income countries, there may be a few 
politically sensitive commodities where applied and bound tariffs are very similar.  If a country 
wants an SSM for even a few commodities, it must support the proposal to create this 
mechanism for all commodities.   13
Stochastic Simulation Model  
This section briefly reviews the stochastic simulation model used to evaluate the July 
Package SSM proposal.
7  The model is a static, synthetic, stochastic, global, partial equilibrium 
model of the world wheat sector calibrated to supply and demand data averaged over the 1999-
2001 reference years.
8  The model includes 38 countries/regions, 32 of which are net importers.  
The equations used to represent a typical wheat importing country include a domestic price 
linkage equation which relates the importing country’s domestic price to the world price adjusted 
for the exchange rate, the applied tariff rate, and potentially, an additional SSM tariff.
9   The 
price linkage for net exporting countries are similar except there is no adjustment for tariffs, and 
modifications are made to handle domestic farm programs discussed below. 
Local wheat supply and food and feed demands are a function of the domestic price.  Net 
trade for each country (defined as net exports) is calculated with beginning and ending stocks 
held fixed.  Global market-clearing determines the world price by forcing to zero the sum of net 
trade across all countries.  The parameters in the model are derived from elasticities in the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s AGLINK model (OECD 2002)
10.    
In order to simulate the operation of the July Package SSM, pseudo-random error terms, 
which are derived from the residuals of trend regression equations for each country are 
incorporated into the supply, food demand and price linkage equations.  Random shocks to an 
                                                 
7 More specific details on the modeling framework can be found in Grant and Meilke (2006). 
8 One may note that our reference years are somewhat outdated given that the final year of developing country 
implementation of the UR market access commitments was 2004.  In light of this fact, the reader should interpret the 
simulation results of the SSM as an upper bound.   
9 Supply, distribution, and trade flows of wheat are obtained from the PS&D database (U.S. Department of 
Agriculture, 2002b). FAOSTAT data are employed where data are missing (Food and Agriculture Organization). 
World prices for wheat are taken from the OECD database and reflect the free on board (fob) U.S. dollar price per-
metric ton of wheat. Exchange rate data are from the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s (USDA) Agricultural 
Exchange Rate Database and the International Monetary Fund’s Financial Statistics Yearbook for the period 1999–
2001 (International Monetary Fund, U.S. Department of Agriculture 2002a). Tariff data are from the Agricultural 
Market Access Database (AMAD) and, in some cases, from United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development’s (UNCTAD) Trade Analysis and Information System (TRAINS) database. 
10 The elasticities are provided in Grant (2003) and available from the authors upon request.   14
individual country’s supply and food demand results in random net imports.  As imports 
increase, the volume trigger of the SSM can be breached and the importing country is allowed to 
impose an SSM duty.
 11  Because of the pseudo-random errors, not all importers will breach the 
volume trigger at the same time.  To introduce some differentiation in domestic price 
movements, a pseudo-random error term is attached to the exchange rate in each country’s price 
linkage equation.  In this way some countries will apply the price based safeguard while others 
are not and the size of the additional duty allowed will vary across countries depending on the 
size of the error term.
12     
Ad valorem tariffs are the primary policies considered.  However two domestic policies 
are incorporated into the model: the U.S. loan rate and the EU’s intervention pricing system.  In 
the U.S., the average loan rate for wheat during 1999-2001 was US$94.80/mt and the average 
farm price was US$96.63/mt.  Thus, in the benchmark equilibrium, the loan rate is not binding. 
However, in the stochastic simulations, the farm price may drop below the loan rate.  In this 
case, the price received by U.S. producers is not allowed to fall below the loan rate and the 
government cost of an implied deficiency payment equal to the difference between the loan rate 
and the market price is calculated.  We assume that U.S. consumer prices for food and feed 
demand are allowed to follow market prices to levels below the loan rate.    
  The EU paid substantial export subsidies on wheat in 1999 and 2000, when the 
intervention price was 119 euro/mt. However, almost no export subsidies were paid in 2001, 
when the intervention price was lowered to 101 euro/mt.  The WTO notifications show that EU 
export subsidy payments averaged 15 euro/mt in 1999-2001. Thus, we assume that the EU farm 
                                                 
11 Due to the potential size of the additional volume based SSM duties (discussed shortly), we added an autarky 
condition to each WTO developing country’s net trade equation (5) that does not allow them to switch to a net 
exporter in the model.   
12 Due to the low quality of domestic price data that exists for many developing and least-developed countries, it is 
extremely difficult to introduce shipment-by-shipment price variability for each country.   15
price equals the average intervention price and a 15 euro/mt export subsidy payment is 
incorporated by defining an EU export price for wheat.  This export price is equal to the farm 
price minus 15 euro/mt or 95.6 euro/mt.  When the world price falls below the 110.6 euro/mt 
average intervention price, the appropriate export subsidy is calculated.     
WTO Members have agreed on a tiered approach to cutting tariffs as contained in the 
July (2008) Package.  In the policy scenarios, we are interested in the cost and stability 
implications of the July Package SSM when it is used in conjunction with tariff cuts.  Modeling 
the SSM in conjunction with a tariff cutting exercise is important because the additional volume-
based SSM duties are tied to bound tariff levels such that deeper cuts to bound tariffs will result 
in smaller additional SSM duties.   
Developed countries have four tiers of less than or equal to 20 percent, greater than 20 
percent but less than or equal to 50 percent; greater than 50 percent but less than or equal to 75 
percent, and greater than 75 percent.  The tariff cuts in these bands correspond to 50, 57, 64, and 
(66) or (73) percent respectively (WTO 2008).
13  Developing countries have tiers of zero to less 
than or equal to 30 percent; greater than 30 percent but less than or equal to 80 percent; greater 
than 80 percent but less than 130 percent; and greater than 130 percent.  Developing country 
tariff cuts are equal to two-thirds of the developed country cut within the respective bands.  
Least-developed countries are not required to make tariff cuts. 
In each liberalization scenario, the EU’s intervention price is lowered from 110.6 euro/mt 
to 101 euro/mt, its actual value since 2001, while the U.S. loan rate program is left unchanged. 
Results 
Three policy experiments are conducted.  In scenario one (July Package Tariff Cuts) we 
assess the impact of the July 2008 tariff cutting proposal.  In scenario two (Tariff Cuts with July 
                                                 
13 In the model we cut tariffs by 66 percent in the final developed country band.   16
Package SSM & Pre-Doha Bound Tariff Cap) we assess the market stability and welfare 
implications of the July Package SSM for developing and least-developed countries 
simultaneously with the July 2008 tariff cuts and do not allow low-income countries to exceed 
their pre-Doha bound tariff levels when the SSM is triggered.
14  Scenario three (Tariff Cuts with 
July Package SSM & No Pre-Doha Bound Tariff Cap) is identical to scenario two except we 
allow developing and least-developed countries to exceed their pre-Doha bound tariff levels.   
Scenario one is measured with respect to the benchmark equilibrium (1999-2001).  To isolate the 
cost and stability implications of the SSM, scenarios two and three are judged with respect to the 
tariff cutting scenario alone (scenario one) and not the benchmark equilibrium.  The policy 
results are obtained by averaging the results over 1000 drawings of pseudo-random errors.  In 
this way, it is possible to measure the number of times the SSM is triggered, the size of the 
additional duties and its effects on the stability of key market variables.   
Scenario 1: July Package Tariff Cuts 
The impacts of the July 2008 tariff cuts from bound rates are modest (Table 2). World 
prices rise by only 3.91 percent and most of this price rise (two percentage points) is due to 
lowering the EU intervention price.  This result is driven by the large differences between 
applied and bound tariffs.  Cutting bound tariffs only results in a reduction in applied rates in 
four countries: Japan, Egypt, Nigeria, and a group of other developed countries (DCG) (Iceland, 
Switzerland and Norway).
15   However, domestic prices are more stable for 30 out of 31 net 
importing countries (the exception being Brazil) (Table 2).  In Japan and the DCG, large tariff 
cuts result in a decrease in the standard deviation of their domestic price by over 38 and 41 
percent, respectively.     
                                                 
14 Least developed countries are granted an SSM in the model but are not required to make tariff cuts.  
15 The only reason the July Package Tariff Cuts forced a reduction in Egypt’s applied tariff rate is because Egypt’s 
bound and applied rate are both five percent.    17
Globally, world welfare increases by 1.15 percent or $1.28 billion (Table 3).
 16  However, 
the distribution of welfare changes is mixed. Developed importers gain 21.75 percent on average 
due to the large tariff cuts (and welfare gains) in Japan and the DCG.  Developing and least 
developed countries lose 2.27 and 2.78 percent, respectively, due to higher world prices.  All 
four developed exporters gain by an average of 1.52 percent due to higher world prices for wheat 
exports.     
Scenario 2: Tariff Cuts with July Package SSM & Pre-Doha Bound Tariff Cap 
The July Package SSM with a bound tariff cap at pre-Doha levels results in domestic 
prices rising in 23 out of 31 low-income countries but becoming less stable in 21 out of 31 low-
income countries (Table 2) relative to cutting tariffs alone.  Remarkably, the SSM stabilized 
import volumes (over and above cutting tariffs alone) in 27 out of 31 low-income countries.   
Moreover, if we restrict our attention to the 25 low-income WTO Members eligible to use the 
SSM, imports are stabilized in 24 out of 25 cases.  World prices fall only slightly (-0.90 percent) 
as a result of the SSM and become less stable with the standard deviation increasing by over 16 
percent compared to scenario one (see appendix I for full list of results).   
   Several countries including Mexico, Morocco, Tunisia, the United Arab Emirates, and 
many least-developed countries experienced large increases in the standard deviation around 
domestic prices.   This result is driven by the size and frequency with which they apply the SSM.  
For example, Morocco increased its domestic price instability by 165 percent because it applies 
                                                 
16 The countries in each group are:  (1) Exporters – Australia, Canada, EU-25; U.S., Argentina, and Kazakhstan; (2) 
Developed Importers – Israel, Japan and a group of developed importers (DCG); (3) Developing Countries – 
Algeria, Brazil, China, Columbia, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Peru, 
Philippines, South Korea, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, Venezuela and six geographically aggregated groups 
consisting of African developing countries (AFD), Central American developing countries (CTA), South American 
developing countries (STA), Asian developing countries (ASG), Middle East developing countries (MEG) and a  
Rest of the World (ROW) group; and (4) Least Developed Countries – Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Yemen and two 
geographically aggregated groups consisting of South African least developed countries (SAG) and North African 
least developed countries (NAG).   18
the volume safeguard almost 30 percent of the time (296 times out of 1000), well above the 13.7 
percent average for all eligible SSM countries.  Moreover, the size of Morocco’s applied tariff 
rate plus the additional volume based SSM averaged 87 percent which is among the highest of all 
developing countries.  Bangladesh increased its domestic price instability by some 574 percent 
(appendix I) not necessarily because it applied the volume or price SSM excessively (26 and 18) 
percent of the time, respectively) but because its additional volume-based SSM duties ranged 
from 50 percentage points (25 percent of its bound tariff) to 100 percentage points (50 percent of 
its bound tariff), well above the average volume-based SSM duty of 36 percent.   
On the other hand, there are several countries that stabilized domestic prices using the 
July Package SSM for wheat.  For example, the Philippines and South Korea used the price-
based SSM 29 and 33 percent of the time, very similar to Morocco and Bangladesh’s use of the 
volume trigger discussed above.  However, the Philippines and South Korea increase and 
stabilize their domestic wheat prices because they apply they impose smaller price-based 
additional SSM duties.  The average price-based SSM duty for these two countries is 3.8 and 3.9 
percent, respectively.   
The welfare cost of the July Package SSM is $204 million (Table 3), compared to a 
welfare gain of $1.28 billion from trade liberalization (i.e., cutting tariffs alone). Thus, 84 
percent of the increase in world welfare is still realized when low-income countries are granted 
an SSM.  All wheat exporters (Australia, Canada, EU, US, Argentina and Kazakhstan) lose 
slightly when low-income countries are granted an SSM.  Nineteen out of 29 low-income 
importing countries gain by using the SSM; however, for least-developed countries, the losses in 
Bangladesh (-2.86 percent) and Ethiopia (-0.55 percent) are large enough to result in an average 
loss (-0.41 percent) for all least-developed countries.   19
Scenario 3: Tariff Cuts with July Package SSM & No Pre-Doha Bound Tariff Cap 
  This final scenario is analogous to the previous scenario except that we allow developing 
and least-developed countries to (potentially) exceed their pre-Doha bound tariff rates when the 
SSM is triggered.  In the interest of space most of the discussion will focus on the frequency of 
application and additional SSM duties.  In terms of market stability, domestic prices in 24 
countries (versus 21 in scenario two) out of 31 low-income countries become less stable (Table 
2).  Twenty-five (versus 27 in scenario two) low-income countries stabilized imports.  Moreover, 
allowing low-income countries to breach their pre-Doha bound tariffs costs just 19 million -- a 
very small amount in terms of the economic welfare gains from pure tariff reform (Table 3).    
  Table 4 summarizes pre-Doha bound and current applied tariff rates, the frequency of 
SSM use, the average and maximum duties imposed, and the number of times pre-Doha bound 
rates are breached for each of the 25 countries eligible to use the SSM.   Looking across the final 
row, low-income countries used the price-based SSM relatively more than the volume SSM at 
23.9 and 14.3 percent respectively.  Bangladesh, a least developed country not making tariff cuts 
to bound rates, stands out as applying the highest volume SSM duties.  For all others however, 
countries seem to be making use of the maximum duty options contained in the July Package 
SSm rather than applying a duty that is based on a percentage of their bound tariff.  This result is 
driven by the fact that as bound tariff come down through further tariff cuts, so too will the size 
of the additional SSM duties unless there is provision of choosing a higher duty which is the case 
in the July Package.   
  The most interesting piece of information contained in Table 4 is the number of times a 
country exceeds its pre-Doha bound tariff rate, and whether this is due to the volume or price 
SSM.  Collectively, all low-income countries exceeded their pre-Doha bound tariff rates 4.6   20
percent of the time, with many countries never doing so.  Brazil, Egypt, Indonesia, Korea, 
Mexico, Philippines, Asian Developing Group (ASG), the South American Developing Group 
(STA), and Ethiopia are only nine countries out of 25 that breached their pre-Doha bound tariff 
rates with the SSM for wheat.  Ethiopia stands out because it used the volume SSM almost 40 
percent of the time and almost always chose the 25, 40, or 50 percent maximum duties the July 
Package allows. Conversely, Egypt exceeded its pre-Doha bound tariff rate almost 34 percent of 
the time by applying the price SSM.  However, Egypt’s case for wheat is very similar to China’s 
in Table 1 because Egypt’s applied and bound tariff rates for wheat in 2001 were five percent.  
Thus, the question of whether or not developing countries should be allowed to exceed their pre-
Doha bound tariffs depends fundamentally on the product being traded, the extent to which 
bound tariffs will be cut, and the gap between applied and bound tariffs.     
Conclusions  
The critical elements of the SSM are product coverage, reference periods, trigger 
mechanisms and remedy measures.
17  Discussion over a new SSM for developing countries took 
center stage in the July mini-ministerial conference in Geneva because WTO Members could not 
bridge their differences on whether developing countries should be allowed to exceed their pre-
Doha bound tariffs.  Chairman Falconer’s recent Draft Text commits WTO Members to establish 
an SSM for developing countries as part of an acceptable agricultural package.       
We combined the recent July Package tariff cuts with an SSM for developing countries to 
evaluate the market stabilization and welfare cost of the this policy instrument.  The July 
Package SSM costs very little in terms of economic welfare.  When we allow developing and 
least-developed WTO Members the use of an SSM in conjunction with tariff cuts (scenario 2), 
                                                 
17 There are other elements of the SSM currently under negotiation including country eligibility and the duration of 
additional duties or other remedies.   21
but did not allow them to exceed their pre-Doha bound tariffs, global welfare fell by only 
US$204 million.  Similarly, the welfare cost of an SSM with no cap on the level of the additional 
duties they can impose results in a welfare loss of $223 million.  Thus, exceeding pre-Doha 
bound tariffs may have been a small price to pay (roughly 19 million) to reach a final deal on 
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Table 1: The G33 and July Package SSM Duties for Cereals 
-------------------------------------------------------------------G33-SSM Proposal------------------------------------------------------------------- 
   ---------------------Examples of Additional SSM Duties---------------- 
   India  Bangladesh  China 
Import Surge  Remedy  Tb=120; Ta=40  Tb=200; Ta=10  Tb=25; Ta=24 
       
X <= 110%  No Remedy  0% ----> 40%  0% ----> 10%  0% ----> 24% 
       
110% < X <= 115%  Max{0.25*Tb, 25 Percentage Points}  30% ----> 70%  50% ----> 60%  25% ----> 49% 
        
115% < X <= 135%  Max{0.4*Tb, 40 Percentage Points}  48% ----> 88%  80% ----> 90%  40% ----> 64% 
        
X > 135%  Max{0.5*Tb, 50 Percentage Points}  60% ----> 100%  100% ----> 110%  50% ----> 74% 
       
---------------------------------------------------------------July Package SSM Proposal--------------------------------------------------------------
   ---------------------Examples of Additional SSM Duties---------------- 
   India  Bangladesh  China 
Import Surge  Remedy  Tb=120; Ta=40  Tb=200; Ta=10  Tb=25; Ta=24 
       
X <= 105%  No Remedy  0  0  0 
       
105% < X <= 110%  Max{0.50*Tb, 40 Percentage Points}  60% ----> 100% 100%  ---->  110%  40% ----> 64% 
        
110% < X <= 130%  Max{0.75*Tb, 50 Percentage Points}  90% ----> 130%  150% ----> 160%  50% ----> 74% 
       
X > 130%  Max{Tb, 60 Percentage Points}  120% ----> 160%  200% ----> 210%  60% ----> 84% 
Source: WTO World Tariff Profiles (2006) 
Note: Tb and Ta denote bound and applied tariff rates, respectively.  In the columns labeled India, Bangladesh, China, the first number denotes the maximum 
additional SSM duty that can potentially be applied give the import surge, whereas the second number denotes the new applied tariff rate inclusive of the 
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Figure 1:  Effect on Import Prices of the G33, July Package, and Uruguay Round  
      Price-Based Safeguard Mechanisms 
 
Note: Tssg, Tg33, and Tjuly denote the additional safeguard duties under the Uruguay Round, G33, and July 
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Figure 2.  Additional Price-Based SSM Duties of the Uruguay Round (SSG), G33, and July 
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Figure 3.  Average Applied and Bound Tariff Rates for Cereal Products, 2006 
 







Table 2.  Price and Stability Effects for 31 Low-Income Countries 
  July Package Tariff Cuts
a  July Package Tariff Cuts with SSM & Cap 
on Pre-Doha Bound Tariffs
b 
July Package Tariff Cuts with SSM & No 
Cap on Pre-Doha Bound Tariffs
b 
  ----------Mean-------- -----Stability----- ----------Mean-------- -----Stability----- ----------Mean------- -----Stability----- 
  Up Down  More  less  Up Down  More less  Up  Down  More  less 
Domestic Price  31 0 30  1  23 8 10  21  23  8 7 24 
                  
Producer Surplus  28 0 13  15  21 7 18  10  21  7  16  12 
                  
Imports  3 28  27  4  5 26  27 4 5  26  25 6 
  World Price Increase = 3.91%  World Price Decrease = -1.16%  World Price Decrease = -0.90% 
 
Note: The results in the table are based on 1,000 pseudo-random draws and show the number of countries in each category.  For domestic price and imports, 
there are 31 low-income countries.  For producer surplus, three low-income countries (Indonesia, Malaysia and Philippines) that have no wheat production for a 
total of 28 countries in this category. 
a Scenario one (July Package Tariff Cuts) is measured relative to the baseline (1999-2001). 
b Scenarios two and three (July Package Tariff Cuts with SSM and July Package Tariff Cuts with G33-SSM) are measured relative scenario one -- the tariff 
cutting scenario without an SSM. 
 
 28 
Table 3.  Summary of Welfare Changes across each Scenario 
  -----July Package Tariff Cuts
a---- 
July Package Tariff Cuts with SSM & 
Cap on Pre-Doha Bound Tariffs
b 
July Package Tariff Cuts with SSM & No 
Cap on Pre-Doha Bound Tariffs
b 
  Gain Loss  Welfare Δ (%)  Gain Loss  Welfare Δ (%)  Gain Loss  Welfare Δ (%) 
Exporters  6  0 1.52 0  6 -0.34 0  6  -0.44 
Developed Importers  2 1  21.75  3 0  0.37  3 0  0.48 
Developing Importers  0 24  -2.27  16 8  0.05  15 9  0.10 
Least Developed Importers  0 5  -2.78  3 2  -0.41  3 2  -0.53 
World  8  30 1.15 22  16 -0.18 21  17  -0.20 
  Welfare Gain by Value = $1.28 Billion  Welfare Loss by Value = $-204 Million  Welfare Loss by Value = $-223 Million 
Note: The results in the table are based on 1000 pseudo-random draws. Gain and Loss show the number of countries that gained or lost in each category. Welfare 
Δ (%) is the average change in aggregate economic welfare for all of the countries belonging to a particular category. 
a  Scenario one (July Package Tariff Cuts) is measured relative to the baseline (1999-2001). 
b Scenarios two and three (July Package Tariff Cuts with SSM and July Package Tariff Cuts with G33-SSM) are measured relative scenario one -- the tariff 
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# of Times Vol. 
Safeguard 
Exceeded Pre-
Doha Bound Rate 
# of Times Price 
Safeguard 
Exceeded Pre-








Developing                 
Algeria 80  3  26.8%  5.2%  19.2% 40.0%  0.0%  0.0%  27.0%  5.0% 
Brazil 55  13  27.0%  16.8%  44.3% 50.0%  0.2%  0.1%  33.9%  5.6% 
Columbia 124  15  31.4%  2.6%  25.6% 25.0%  0.0%  0.0%  25.0%  5.0% 
Egypt 5  5  33.9% 13.3%  5.0% 40.0%  13.3%  33.9%  31.7% 3.3% 
Indonesia 30  0  25.8%  21.2%  30.0% 40.0%  14.1%  0.1%  35.0%  6.8% 
Korea 9  4  32.8%  5.7%  9.0% 40.0%  5.7%  12.1%  28.7% 4.1% 
Morocco 170  49  19.0%  30.4%  18.9% 50.0%  0.0%  0.0%  38.1%  4.5% 
Mexico 67  28  14.4%  18.2%  12.6% 50.0%  13.4%  0.0%  36.5%  2.9% 
Malaysia 69  11  27.9%  0.1%  18.7% 25.0%  0.0%  0.0%  25.0%  4.5% 
Nigeria 150  81  29.0%  20.1%  17.6% 50.0%  0.0%  0.0%  34.0%  4.0% 
Peru 68  20  26.6%  3.7%  15.9% 40.0%  0.0%  0.0%  25.4%  4.4% 
Philippines 30  15  29.2%  4.4%  18.6% 40.0%  4.4%  0.1%  29.1%  4.0% 
Tunisia 100  20  16.4%  30.6%  17.1% 50.0%  0.0%  0.0%  39.1%  4.8% 
United A.E.  80  4  16.9%  31.1%  18.7%  50.0%  0.0%  0.0%  38.1%  4.1% 
Venezuela 118  15  26.8%  0.9%  17.9% 25.0%  0.0%  0.0%  25.0%  4.5% 
AFD 72  29  21.4%  14.1%  16.7% 40.0%  0.0%  0.0%  32.1%  4.1% 
ASG 34  10  23.2%  12.1%  15.1% 50.0%  12.1%  0.0%  32.8%  3.5% 
CTA 83  4  23.9%  6.7%  17.6% 40.0%  0.0%  0.0%  27.7%  4.3% 
STA 36  10  18.4%  16.7%  15.8% 50.0%  12.3%  0.0%  36.6%  3.8% 
MEG 35  1  27.0%  0.8%  18.5% 25.0%  0.0%  0.0%  25.0%  4.3% 
Least-Developed             0.0%  0.0%    
Bangladesh 200  5  18.4%  26.6%  17.9% 100.0%  0.0%  0.0%  78.1%  4.2% 
Ethiopia 30  5  11.8%  39.7%  14.1% 50.0%  39.7%  0.0%  44.8%  4.1% 
NAG 75  7  23.7%  12.3%  16.8% 40.0%  0.0%  0.0%  31.3%  4.9% 
SAG 78  6  26.3%  4.2%  15.3% 40.0%  0.0%  0.0%  28.6%  4.3% 
YE 80  0  20.7%  20.8%  17.3% 40.0%  0.0%  0.0%  33.7%  4.6% 
World 75.16  14.37  23.9%  14.3%  18.2%  43.6% 4.6%  1.9% 33.7%  4.4% 
Note: Freq. of Vol. and Price SSM measures the number of times the volume and price SSM were triggered out of 100 random draws; Max. Price and Vol. 
Safeguard denotes the maximum duty triggered; and Mean Vol. and Price Safeguard reports the average safeguard duty applied out of 1000 random draws. See 
footnote 14 for a description of country/regional aggregations.   30
Appendix I.  Individual Country Results, Scenario 2,  
 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Wheat  Variables-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  Price (%)  Production (%)  Total Use (%)  Net Trade (%)  Cons. Surplus (%)  Prod. Surplus (%)  Gov’t Revenue (%)  Net Welfare (%) 
COUNTRY Mean Stdev Mean Stdev Mean Stdev Mean Stdev Mean Stdev Mean Stdev Mean Stdev Mean Stdev 
Developed                  
Australia  -0.90 9.46 -0.52 -0.94 0.22  5.89 -0.83 -1.00 0.38  2.03 -1.32 -1.97  ----  ----  -0.60 -1.91 
Canada  -0.90 14.11 -0.55 -0.72 0.58 10.99 -1.01 -0.44 0.36  1.46 -1.31 -0.59  ----  ----  -0.55 -1.29 
EU-25  -0.25 -0.60 -0.15 -1.44 0.14 -0.56  -11.62  -3.69 0.28 -0.29 -0.36 -3.44 18.36 13.52 0.00 -0.56 
Israel  -0.90  12.19  -0.35  12.19  0.50 7.08 0.55 7.31 0.16 0.14 -1.10  11.55  -0.39 6.44 0.25 0.34 
Japan  -0.90 5.09 -1.29 1.11 0.42 3.73 0.50 3.87 0.76 3.67 -2.10  -0.25  -0.28 1.85 0.51 2.76 
USA  -0.66 2.14 -0.31 -0.14 0.46 11.71 -1.23 -0.72 0.17  1.01 -0.87 -0.73  120.64  72.02 -0.13 -0.93 
DCG  -0.90  10.35  -1.48 4.11 0.33 2.09 1.06 4.79 0.52 1.10 -2.72 2.24 0.09 -0.94 0.37 0.77 
Developing                  
Algeria  1.39 23.27 0.86 -4.87 -0.30 -2.77 -0.64  -10.98  -0.62 -3.01 1.53 -5.40 91.09  3076.84  0.28  0.45 
Argentina  -0.90 16.45 -0.49 -0.66 0.30  1.37 -0.82 -0.61 0.61  1.70 -1.26 -0.64  ----  ----  -0.56 -1.08 
Brazil  4.43 -14.87 3.08 -12.30 -2.61 -19.73 -4.62 -32.62 -4.86 -22.73 5.71 -12.47 39.20 837.07 -0.15  -3.26 
China  -0.84 13.62 -0.12 -0.74  0.57 10.83  -23.70 -2.37  1.13 11.12 -0.94 -1.89  ----  ----  0.02  -0.27 
Columbia  0.63 -19.59 ----  ----  -0.23 -6.66 -0.23 -6.66 -0.50 -7.37 0.63 -19.59  10.93  329.29 0.49  1.00 
Egypt  -0.26 -1.39 -0.12 -0.67 0.06 -0.90 0.24 -1.45 0.11 -0.88 -0.35 -1.48 20.70  179.11 0.16  0.13 
Indonesia  5.82 -12.76  ----  ----  -6.25 -33.15 -6.20 -33.15  -13.22  -39.44  ----  ----  A  B  0.41  -4.30 
Iran  -0.90  14.96  -0.59 0.45 0.17 0.84 1.25 1.05 0.35 1.03 -1.31 0.25  ----  ----  0.14 0.34 
Iraq  -0.90  16.45  -0.59 0.44 0.08 -0.04 0.22 -0.09 0.14 0.03 -1.26 -0.11  ----  ----  0.12 0.02 
Kazakhstan  -0.90 2.10 -0.46 0.00 0.26 0.24 -1.29 0.02 0.17 -0.01 -1.21 -0.56  ----  ----  -0.21 -0.20 
Malaysia  -0.03  -18.21 ----  ----  0.01 -2.03 0.01 -2.03 0.01 -2.08  ----  ----  8.03  325.26  0.52 2.48 
Mexico  3.79 68.14 2.54 -13.08 -2.06 11.64 -8.79 -5.10 -3.50  3.13  5.62  -2.62  6.34 63.76 -0.60 -2.59 
Morocco  7.05 165.95 6.43 -22.59 -1.59 14.37 -7.93 -32.97 -3.21 11.86 9.49 -17.82  15.62 87.90 -0.78  5.16 
Nigeria  3.33  33.38  2.44  0.25  -4.93 -29.01 -5.11 -29.05  -10.37  -34.11 5.33  4.88  3.54  28.86 -2.57 -20.08 
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Appendix I cont’d 
 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Wheat  Variables-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  Price (%)  Production (%)  Total Use (%)  Net Trade (%)  Cons. Surplus (%)  Prod. Surplus (%)  Gov’t Revenue (%)  Net Welfare (%) 
COUNTRY  Mean Stdev Mean Stdev Mean Stdev Mean Stdev Mean Stdev Mean Stdev Mean Stdev Mean Stdev 
Developing                  
Peru  0.52  0.38  0.40 -2.63 -0.19 -6.93 -0.27 -8.47 -0.43 -7.52 0.82 -1.88 7.61 287.82 0.43  0.58 
Philippines  0.37 -21.81  ----  ----  -0.39 -16.53 -0.39 -16.53 -0.30  -3.72  ----  ----  9.14 480.21 0.68  1.20 
South  Korea  0.22 -12.76  ----  ----  -0.25 -12.47 -0.25 -12.47 -0.21  -9.03  0.22 -12.76 29.17  2496.29 1.04  6.42 
Tunisia  9.16 198.32 5.82 -17.80 -2.30 -15.36  -11.44  -38.64 -4.69 -17.33 12.83 -9.24 42.49 249.55 -0.57  -2.96 
United  A.E  10.68 313.89  ----  ----  -5.83 -29.67 -5.84 -29.67  -13.01  -37.77 10.68 313.89  297.57  2074.42  -0.47  -3.82 
Venezuela  0.05 -16.69 0.03 -0.08 -0.02 -3.52 -0.02 -3.52 -0.06 -3.70 0.07 -1.90 6.52 251.67 0.63  2.01 
AFD  2.75  36.75  3.01  -5.08  -2.10 -17.20 -3.54 -22.44 -4.32 -18.89 5.62  -2.79 10.78 187.23 -0.41  -7.38 
CTA  1.43  38.87  ----  ----  -0.73 -14.50 -0.73 -14.50 -1.64 -16.24 1.43  38.87 53.59  1981.15 0.81  1.05 
STA  3.08  17.84  3.00 -16.29 -1.48  -4.01  -7.97 -18.76 -2.99  -6.17  5.79 -14.12 25.76 263.94 -0.20  0.34 
ASG  1.25  -0.43  1.08  -7.31  -0.94 -13.28 -2.23 -20.71 -1.86 -14.02 2.00  -6.99 20.54 384.85 0.29  0.50 
MEG  0.16 -18.74 ----  ----  -0.06 -4.23 -0.06 -4.23 -0.14 -4.51 0.16 -18.74  596.61  33257.84  0.70  2.86 
ROW  -0.90  15.86  -0.69 3.74 0.72 1.30 4.20 3.19 1.41 1.58 -1.42 4.50 3.05 0.47 0.29 0.51 
Least-Developed                  
Bangladesh  16.62 573.97  5.75  77.28  -9.28  0.48  -28.18 32.29 -17.49 -9.99  21.96 379.28 53.77 297.25 -2.86 -24.15 
Ethiopia  8.47 163.77 3.36  -9.73  -4.19 -21.12  -28.25  -36.21 -8.63 -24.74 10.43 11.19 134.71  311.43 -0.55  -2.18 
Yemen  6.51 192.88 1.55  2.70  -2.75 -27.27 -3.10 -27.69 -5.99 -31.59 7.63  46.10  C  D  0.26  -1.96 
SAG  0.85  0.35  0.71  0.43  -0.58 -12.00 -0.80 -12.16 -1.21 -13.05 1.46  2.45  27.15  E  0.68  0.57 
NAG  3.08  58.09  2.73  6.43  -2.86 -19.62 -2.99 -19.36 -5.92 -22.90 5.83  13.71 56.84  1353.06 0.41  -5.41 
WORLD -0.90  16.45  -0.09  -2.32  -0.09  -2.32  ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ----  -0.18  -5.30 
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Appendix II.  Individual Country Results, Scenario 3,  
 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Wheat  Variables-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  Price (%)  Production (%)  Total Use (%)  Net Trade (%)  Cons. Surplus (%)  Prod. Surplus (%)  Gov’t Revenue (%)  Net Welfare (%) 
COUNTRY Mean Stdev Mean Stdev Mean Stdev Mean Stdev Mean Stdev Mean Stdev Mean Stdev Mean Stdev 
Developed                  
Australia  -1.15 12.92 -0.67 -1.25 0.29  8.35 -1.06 -1.33 0.48  3.04 -1.70 -2.51  ----  ----  -0.77 -2.47 
Canada  -1.16 19.47 -0.70 -0.91 0.74 15.29 -1.30 -0.47 0.46  2.08 -1.68 -0.54  ----  ----  -0.70 -1.61 
EU-25  -0.33 0.02 -0.20 -1.77 0.19 0.07  -15.20  -4.05 0.36 0.38 -0.47 -3.96  20.69  14.10 0.00 -0.67 
Israel  -1.16 16.98 -0.45 16.98 0.64  9.93  0.71 10.26 0.20  0.18  -1.41 16.08 -0.50  9.23  0.32  0.47 
Japan  -1.15 7.55 -1.65 1.66 0.53 5.58 0.63 5.77 0.97 5.46 -2.63  -0.16  -0.37 2.91 0.65 4.13 
USA  -0.81 2.56 -0.37 -0.14 0.59 16.10 -1.54 -0.91 0.22  1.41 -1.05 -0.85  167.06  98.19 -0.17 -1.21 
DCG  -1.16  13.81  -1.90 5.50 0.43 2.76 1.37 6.37 0.66 1.44 -3.48 3.01 0.11 -1.26 0.47 1.01 
Developing                  
Algeria  1.30 23.02 0.80 -4.93 -0.28 -2.79 -0.60  -11.11  -0.58 -3.00 1.39 -5.57 97.56  3133.96  0.36  0.78 
Argentina  -1.16 22.43 -0.64 -0.91 0.38  1.89 -1.06 -0.84 0.78  2.32 -1.61 -0.74  ----  ----  -0.71 -1.39 
Brazil  4.39 -15.28 3.05 -12.47 -2.59 -20.23 -4.58 -33.28 -4.82 -23.16 5.64 -12.74 40.88 851.80 -0.01  -2.61 
China  -1.06 17.68 -0.15 -0.96  0.71 14.04  -29.81 -2.93  1.43 14.42 -1.18 -2.12  ----  ----  0.02  -0.32 
Columbia  0.56 -19.37 ----  ----  -0.20 -7.19 -0.21 -7.19 -0.45 -7.92 0.56 -19.37  12.15  362.59 0.64  1.47 
Egypt  3.61  55.33  1.72  -6.56  -0.77 -17.13 -3.34 -25.56 -1.60 -18.13 4.71  13.82 137.48  2714.76 0.09  -1.73 
Indonesia  6.90  0.56  ----  ----  -7.42 -34.03 -7.35 -34.03  -15.36  -40.51  ----  ----  A  B  0.14  -7.23 
Iran  -1.16  20.40  -0.75 0.66 0.22 1.13 1.60 1.47 0.44 1.38 -1.68 0.47  ----  ----  0.18 0.45 
Iraq  -1.16  22.43  -0.76 0.64 0.10 -0.06 0.28 -0.13 0.18 0.04 -1.61 -0.03  ----  ----  0.15 0.02 
Kazakhstan  -1.16 2.78 -0.59 0.00 0.34 0.31 -1.67 0.02 0.22 -0.02 -1.55 -0.71  ----  ----  -0.27 -0.25 
Malaysia  -0.13  -17.84 ----  ----  0.04 -2.03 0.04 -2.03 0.08 -2.07  ----  ----  9.37  391.94  0.67 3.41 
Mexico  3.91 73.05 2.63 -12.90 -2.13 13.70 -9.09 -3.46 -3.61  4.57  5.82  -1.50  6.96 66.69 -0.59 -2.54 
Morocco  6.97 164.89 6.36 -22.65 -1.57 13.92 -7.84 -33.25 -3.17 11.44 9.33 -18.03  16.04 88.05 -0.73  5.15 
Nigeria  3.36  33.43  2.46  0.20  -4.97 -29.98 -5.16 -30.04  -10.48  -34.98 5.37  4.85  3.89  29.86 -2.43 -20.40 
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Appendix II cont’d 
 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Wheat  Variables-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  Price (%)  Production (%)  Total Use (%)  Net Trade (%)  Cons. Surplus (%)  Prod. Surplus (%)  Gov’t Revenue (%)  Net Welfare (%) 
COUNTRY  Mean Stdev Mean Stdev Mean Stdev Mean Stdev Mean Stdev Mean Stdev Mean Stdev Mean Stdev 
Developing                  
Peru  0.44  0.67  0.34 -2.78 -0.16 -7.22 -0.23 -8.83 -0.37 -7.79 0.69 -2.10 8.47 305.04 0.55  0.94 
Philippines  0.72 -16.06  ----  ----  -0.76 -16.81 -0.75 -16.81 -0.57  -6.03  ----  ----  12.74 825.89 0.79  -0.02 
South  Korea  1.35 -21.07  ----  ----  -1.57 -21.97 -1.53 -21.97 -1.24 -18.59 1.35 -21.07 59.50  7265.04 1.10  3.68 
Tunisia  9.08 197.52 5.78 -18.04 -2.28 -15.17  -11.35  -38.66 -4.65 -17.12 12.71 -9.57 43.46 251.20 -0.53  -2.88 
United  A.E  10.54 311.28  ----  ----  -5.76 -29.55 -5.76 -29.55  -12.86  -37.58 10.54 311.28  300.55  2071.61  -0.21  -3.52 
Venezuela  -0.05  -16.19  -0.03 0.03 0.02 -3.75 0.02 -3.75 0.03 -3.91 -0.07 -1.78 7.50  288.56  0.81 2.79 
AFD  2.69  37.57  2.95  -5.15  -2.05 -17.72 -3.47 -23.08 -4.25 -19.37 5.49  -2.97 11.48 192.68 -0.24  -7.23 
CTA  1.39  41.19  ----  ----  -0.72 -14.85 -0.72 -14.85 -1.60 -16.55 1.39  41.19 58.40  2098.96 1.06  1.72 
STA  4.49 67.03 4.37  -4.11 -2.16 24.04  -11.63 8.86  -4.26 18.64 8.83  1.81 23.13  218.25  -0.53  2.67 
ASG  2.84 65.94 2.46 -7.67 -2.14  16.27  -5.07 1.22 -4.00 5.29 4.85 -4.96  29.16  558.13  -0.10 0.36 
MEG  0.06 -19.32 ----  ----  -0.02 -4.24 -0.02 -4.24 -0.06 -4.49 0.06 -19.32  685.97  36169.67  0.90  4.00 
ROW  -1.16  21.73  -0.89 5.27 0.92 1.84 5.39 4.50 1.82 2.14 -1.82 6.36 3.87 0.75 0.38 0.65 
Least-Developed                  
Bangladesh  16.94 577.69  5.86  77.23  -9.46  0.95  -28.72 32.69 -17.80 -9.67  22.37 380.82 56.85 303.87 -2.87 -24.25 
Ethiopia  15.62 372.41  6.19  -4.68  -7.73  -25.54 -52.10 -36.56 -15.29 -31.22 19.93  76.10  40.27 227.81 -1.85  -7.22 
Yemen  6.43 192.04 1.53  2.71  -2.72 -27.27 -3.06 -27.69 -5.92 -31.56 7.54  45.83  C  D  0.45  -1.68 
SAG  0.80  1.27  0.67  0.81  -0.54 -12.37 -0.75 -12.47 -1.15 -13.42 1.38  2.81  30.44  E  0.91  2.23 
NAG  3.21  61.89  2.85  6.58  -2.98 -20.14 -3.12 -19.87 -6.16 -23.48 6.07  14.19 62.09  1419.55 0.71  -5.26 
WORLD -1.16  22.43  -0.10  -2.95  -0.10  -2.95  ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ----  -0.20  -5.56 
           Welfare Difference from Tariff Cuts Alone ($US) = $-223 Million 
  
 
 